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Abstract: Maritime surveillance has become one of the main areas in managing overall situational awareness. For example, 
the growing importance of maritime traffic in cross-border trade has created new pressures to develop new technologies for 
accident prevention. Maritime safety is also a matter of concern for continuity management. Automatic ship alarm systems, 
coastal radars and coastal cameras are not alone sufficient equipment to build maritime awareness. The Universal Shipborne 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a ship transponder system that is currently used by most actors in the commercial 
shipping industry. Ships equipped with an AIS transponder send out a packet every few seconds with data about the ship 
and its journey. The transponder transmits and receives information on VHF channels. This globally used tracking system is 
highly vulnerable to hacking. A major maritime traffic problem arises if transponders are switched off. Hybrid threats need 
coordinated hybrid responses; therefore, a cyber situational picture is also needed. The cyber dimension is an essential part 
of the management of situational awareness. This study was conducted on the ground by visiting four situation and 
command centers of the Public Protection and Disaster Relief services located in Southwestern Finland. The main results can 
be summarized so that the failure to use ship transponders affects misuse of the authorities’ technical and physical resources. 
Also, the lack of real time data from ships with limited data transmission capacity affects the correct formation of the 
common situational picture—for example, from the site of an accident. The technical communication solutions of the PPDR 
authorities should be more standardized and management should be more centralized. A hybrid emergency model with 
emergency response functions is necessary. Currently, the flow of real time data is not being transmitted, for example, from 
cruise ships to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre. The developed Hybrid Emergency Response model is a unique 
concept that can be transferred to the maritime environment. By using the OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) process in the 
hybrid emergency model, it is possible to gather meaningful intelligence data related to maritime security. Essential open 
source information has geospatial dimensions. The main purpose of the study is to enhance maritime safety and create a 
common intelligent maritime emergency management system for public safety organizations. 
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1. Introduction 
European governments and the European Public Protection and Disaster Relief services—such as law 
enforcement, firefighting, medical emergency, disaster recovery and military services, but also voluntary 
associations like civil protection activity or voluntary firefighters—have recognized that the lack of 
interoperability of technical systems limits cooperation between authorities. 
 
At the EU level, for example, the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), the European Coast Guard 
Functions Academy Network II (EFGA NET 2), the Early Warning for Increased Situational Awareness (EWISA), 
Safety Authorities in the Arctic Countries (SARC) and Maritime Integrated Surveillance Awareness (MARISA) are 
all currently being developed together by the European Commission and EU/EEA Member States (The Finnish 
Border Guard, 2017, Marisa, 2017).  
 
A domestic strategy plan such as the National CBRNE strategy demonstrates that maritime safety is one of the 
main focus areas when the purpose is to develop a common situational maritime awareness for different 
authorities and decision-makers. The overall aim of the strategy is to continuously improve the prevention of 
and preparedness for CBRNE threats and incidents in order to safeguard society and secure the functions vital 
to society. CBRNE threats refer to hazardous incidents caused by chemical substances (C), biological pathogens 
(B), radioactive material (R), nuclear weapons (N) and explosives (E) as well as by the misuse of expertise related 
to these (CBRNE strategy working group, 2017).  
 
The Finnish Border Guard (including the coast guard services) acts under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior but can be incorporated fully or in part into the defense forces when required by defense readiness. The 
Finnish Defence Forces also monitors sea areas to detect and locate accidents, abnormal events and emergency 
phases in conjunction with the surveillance of territorial integrity and participates in SAR operations by providing 
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The Finnish Border Guard ensures the security of Finland and prevents security threats directed towards Finland 
and Europe at external borders. The Finnish Border Guard has many important tasks. Crime prevention is one of 
the most important areas. It also takes care of people’s safety in the border area and on islands.  
 
Coast guard services may include search and rescue (SAR) at sea and in the air, the protection of coastal waters, 
criminal interdiction, illegal immigration and disaster and humanitarian assistance in operational areas. These 
functions may vary according to the administration, but the core functions are generally the same. The Finnish 
maritime search and rescue (SAR) system is one part of the wider security system of the Finnish Border Guard. 
The Finnish Border Guard has immediate readiness for management and operations during maritime incidents. 
The Coast Guard also promotes the protection of the maritime environment and it covers 1,250 kilometers of 
territorial waters (The Finnish Border Guard, 2018; Kaukanen & Möttönen, 2010; Ministry of the Interior, 2005).  
 
Maritime safety has become one of the main discussion areas between public safety authorities and decision-
makers in Europe. Overall situational awareness requires different kinds of technical solutions that can combine 
and produce correct real time data to support correct decisions. Hybrid threats require a coordinated hybrid 
response. Therefore, a cyber situational picture is an occasional factor when authorities need to create a 
common situational picture—for example, from the scene of an accident. If oil tankers were to collide in the Gulf 
of Finland, the ships could spill up to 30,000 tons of oil into the sea. It is important that the nature of the accident 
is evaluated as soon as it occurs, and the observer must immediately inform the state leadership of major ship 
accidents.  
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Maritime situational awareness and new automated and unmanned technology 
According to the Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence, 2010) situational awareness means the 
understanding of decision-makers and their advisors of what has happened, the circumstances under which it 
happened, the goals of the different parties and the possible development of events, all of which are needed to 
make decisions on a specific issue or range of issues. A general definition of situational awareness is the 
perception of the elements in the environment within time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of their status in the near future (Endsley, 1988). “Situational awareness is the ability to identify, 
process and comprehend the critical information about an incident. It is knowing what is going on around you. 
Situational awareness requires continuous monitoring of relevant sources of information regarding actual 
incidents and developing hazards” (Homeland Security, 2008).  
 
According to Franke and Brynielsson (2014), cyber situational awareness is a subset of situational awareness, 
i.e. cyber situational awareness is the part of situational awareness that concerns the cyber environment. 
 
Communications include sharing and the distribution of information: computer systems; control systems (e.g. 
supervisory control and data acquisition, SCADA); networks, such as the Internet; and cyber services (e.g. 
managed security services), which are all part of the cyber infrastructure. 
 
The European Union has funded many unmanned maritime situational awareness projects. It has been seen as 
a future goal to develop and produce automatic solutions for the maritime environment. Unmanned systems, 
vessels and aerial vehicles will gradually replace human resources. Such technological development also means 
that information systems are more vulnerable to different types of threats, such as cyber threats. Therefore, 
advanced solutions are needed to prevent different kinds of threats. Maritime actors, such as shipbuilders, 
shipping companies and harbors, would need to ensure that their autonomous vessels are protected against 
attacks by hackers or pirates. In other cases, new technology faces big problems because the responsibility for 
maritime traffic is shifting from human actors to automated functions.  
 
Maritime surveillance is understood as the process of watching, monitoring, recording and processing the 
behavior of people, objects and events in order to control activity. The aspects of maritime surveillance 
discussed in this paper include border control, safety and security, customs, fisheries control and environmental 
protection (Kaukanen & Möttönen, 2010).  
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2.2 Organizational influences in Finnish maritime security 
The structural changes within the public sector, such as the regional administration reform, the Emergency 
Response Centre (ERC) reform and ongoing social welfare and health care reform, have influenced the work 
processes of public sector employees over the past ten years. Due to the regional administrative reform, 
preparedness plans also need to be changed. 
 
The Baltic Sea Maritime Incident Response Group (Baltic Sea MIRG) project was established by the Finnish Border 
Guard as the responsible maritime search and rescue authority in cooperation with Finland’s Emergency Rescue 
Services. MIRG is an international project led by the Finnish Border Guard. The purpose of this is to create a 
MIRG coordination model and operational guidelines for international MIRG operations and to support the 
harmonization of MIRG services in Europe (Finnish Border Guard - Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 2016).  
 
The Finnish Border Guard is the lead SAR authority and responsible for coordinating all SAR activity. It has a 
direct emergency number for emergency situations. Under the Maritime Search and Rescue Act (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2005), the Finnish Border Guard:  
 Is responsible for planning, developing and supervising all SAR activity as well as coordinating cooperation 
with other public authorities and volunteers. 
 Coordinates and conducts search and rescue operations. 
 In the event of an emergency, is responsible for coordinating radio communications and facilitating 
telemedical assistance services between medical care providers and vessels. 
 Works to prevent accidents and emergencies. 
 Is responsible for the Maritime Assistance Service (MAS). 
 Is responsible for receiving all distress signals received from maritime, aviation and private emergency 
transmitters and conveying such signals to the relevant national authority as well as the national 
coordination of all COSPAS-SARSAT matters. 
 Provides SAR leadership training and other SAR-related education and training.  
The Finnish Border Guard takes part in search and rescue operations in its control area by providing the 
equipment, personnel resources and expert services needed for search and rescue operations if the scale or 
special nature of the incident makes this necessary. Participation in search and rescue may not endanger 
performance of the border guard functions and the country's military defense services.   
 
The Finnish Border Guard may perform functions in its control area that are needed to find and assist persons 
who have got lost in open country or are otherwise in need of immediate assistance there. The responsibility for 
leading searches for missing persons rests with the police. Separate provisions are laid down on Finnish Border 
Guard functions as part of the maritime search and rescue service (Ministry of the Interior, 2005a; Ministry of 
the Interior, 2005b; Ministry of the Interior, 2009).  
  
The Finnish Border Guard may, using its vessels, aircraft and other special vehicles, provide urgent ambulance 
transport in its control area that the authorities or ambulance service enterprises otherwise handling ambulance 
transport are unable to perform because they lack the vessels, aircraft or other special vehicles (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2009; Ministry of The Interior, 2005).  
 
In its control area, the Finnish Border Guard may provide the kind of special transport that the State is required 
to provide in order to ensure a person's personal safety when no other State authority can provide such 
transportation. The Finnish Border Guard may also, upon request, give executive assistance to some other 
authority in its control area that is required by law to perform a control function (Ministry of the Interior, 2005). 
2.3 Intelligence solutions for public safety organizations 
OSINT is defined as the systematic collection, processing, analysis and production, classification and 
dissemination of information derived from sources openly available to and legally accessible by the public in 
response to particular government requirements serving national security. It is any unclassified information, in 
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any medium, that is generally available to the public, even if its distribution is limited or only available upon 
payment (Glassman & Kang, 2012; Morrow & Odierno, 2012; Nurmi, 2015).   
 
Most information has geospatial dimensions. Examples of geospatial open source include maps, airborne 
imagery, atlases, gazetteers, port plans, gravity data, aeronautical data, navigation data, geodetic data, human 
terrain data (cultural and economic), environmental data, commercial imagery, LIDAR, hyper and multi-spectral 
data, geo-names and features, urban terrain, vertical obstruction data, boundary marker data, geospatial 
mashups, spatial databases and web services. Most of the geospatial data mentioned above is integrated, 
analyzed and syndicated using geospatial software such as a Geographic Information System (GIS) (Morrow & 
Odierno, 2012; Nurmi, 2015; Trottier, 2015; Vetter, 2015; Wood, 2016).  
 
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) identifies social media content in particular as a challenge and opportunity 
for open source investigations (Trottier, 2015). Big data includes processes of analysis, capture, research, 
sharing, storage, visualization and safety of information. Associated with OSINT, Big Data is the ability to map 
standards of behavior and tendencies (Dos Passos, 2016). The availability of worldwide satellite photography, 
often of high resolution, on the web (e.g. Google Earth Pro) has expanded open-source capabilities into areas 
formerly available only to major intelligence services. 
2.3.1 Centralized cyber threat detection  
One way of examining cyber security content automation is through the generalized functional model in use by 
the standards community. As illustrated in Figure 2, the security functions contained in this model generally 
represent the first wave plus a portion of the second wave. Security content automation standards that can 
facilitate the exchange of information with and among functions are annotated adjacent to each function, input 
or output. In general, the functions left to right can be organized into “preincident detection” (asset inventory, 
configuration guidance analysis, vulnerability and threat analysis) 
(National Protection and Programs Directorate, 2011).  
 
Figure 1: Centralized threat detection system 
2.3.2 Multi-layer maritime intelligence system Kingfisher 
Kingfisher is based on a multi-sensor, multi-layer maritime intelligence system that combines a variety of 
information sources to expose the covert movements of vessels and boats. Utilizing Satellite Automatic 
Identification system (S-AIS) data, Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite imagery, electro-optical satellite imagery, 
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), coastal radar, open source intelligence (OSINT) and weather patterns, the 
system is one of the most developed in maritime cyber-physical ecosystems (ISI, 2017).                                                                            
2.4 Emergency maritime communications   
European authorities communicate with each other through the Virve network. There is a need to create a new 
and trusted network with a wide bandwidth. Transmission capacity is often limited in an overload situation, 
therefore there is a need to develop new hybrid communication models to utilize real time data. 
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Shipping in the Baltic Sea, for example, is continuously monitored using AIS tracking. By analyzing historical data 
regarding vessels, the identity, type, position, speed and traffic intensity can be mapped in detail and provide 
important input to marine spatial planning. Along with more precise information about the monitored ships and 
the results of port state controls, AIS data can also make it easier to assess different short- and long-term effects 
of shipping on the marine environment. There are several AIS tracking websites on the internet that citizens can 
visit and use (SIME, 2014).  
 
The use of emergency services with the COSPAS-SARSAT satellite system requires an emergency transmitter. 
Locating an emergency transmitter in emergency situations is much more accurate and faster if the emergency 
transmitter also includes GPS positioning. Figure 1. illustrates how the COSPAS-SARSAT system works 
(Secretariat of the Cospas-Sarsat Programme, 2016).  
 
Figure 2: Basics concept of the COSPAS-SARSAT system 
2.4.1 SAR suitable equipment 
The Finnish Border Guard’s vessels and aircraft are used in 70 per cent of all maritime SAR activity in Finland 
(The Finnish Border Guard, 2018). Patrol vessel Turva started operations in 2014. The vessels underwater 
activities center provides the ability to create an underwater situational picture. Vessels are also identified at 
the request of other authorities in relation to their needs. With its sensors, Turva brings more performance to 
METO cooperation. The underwater activities center is used to conduct underwater activities. The DP2 classified 
standby system enables efficient and safe operation at the side of the accident. Turva's equipment includes 
different kinds of systems, such as a 3D radar, thermal camera, searchlight and scanning sonars and modern 
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ROV equipment. In connection with the use of ROV equipment, the two Turva crews have continuous 
preparedness to use divers. The Super Puma together with Turva provide quick access to additional information, 
such as information about identifiable objects or target areas. NVG functions, the Virtual Horizon system and 
the HVLA (Helicopter Visual Landing Aid) system enable safe cooperation (Simola et al., 2015).   
2.5 Distributed Systems Intercommunication Protocol (DSiP)   
DSiP enables multiple simultaneous communication channels between the remote end and the control room: if 
one communication channel is down, other channels will continue to operate. DSiP makes communication 
reliable and unbreakable by using various physical communication methods in parallel. Applications, equipment 
and devices can communicate over a single unbreakable data channel. Satellite, TETRA, 2G/3G/4G, VHF radios 
and other technologies can be used simultaneously. DSiP is simultaneously a protocol-level and routing-level 
traffic engineering software solution for intelligently handling data routing, using all kinds of physical media, 
including IP and non-IP communication. The latest innovation is an all-in-one solution DSiP-router-laptop 
(Rajamäki & Villemson, 2009; Simola & Rajamäki, 2015). 
3. Research background, method and process 
PPDR authorities are tasked with the challenge of providing the first response in life-critical circumstances. The 
ability to create the right situational awareness and reliable communication with each other are the most 
important issues between the PPDR, military and voluntary services. 
 
The West Finland Coast Guard District has its own main situation and command center in Turku and it is called 
the Command and Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC Turku). The approach of this case study handles 
mainly the West Finland Coast Guard District and the Command and Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and 
their relationship to each other’s situation centers and emergency response centers.  
 
This case study is carried out with the guidance of Yin (2014). The case study illustrates the attempt to produce 
profound and detailed information about the object being researched. The materials collected for this case study 
are based on observations, interviews, scientific publications, collected articles and literary material. 
Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their expertise in their specialist roles: they operate or have operated 
in public safety organizations. One of the interviewees has been a technical developer in public safety 
organizations. The interviews were recorded and analyzed using the qualitative content analysis method.  
 
The case study’s empirical research approach is due to the fact that the researcher had to study more deeply 
the culture of the situational centers and the actual working environment of employees working in the field. 
Participant observation makes it possible to get close to the actors.  
4. Case study findings  
The Finnish Border Guard uses mainly Virve telephones for communication between authorities, but VHF and 
MF connections are also widely used in the coastal area. They have a direct emergency number for emergency 
situations. In addition, the emergency calls placed by citizens can be redirected from the Emergency Response 
Centers to the MRCC Turku. Their own command and control center (the Command and Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre) reserves cooperation in multi-authority situations if a long-standing major accident occurs. 
In a situation such as this, managerial personnel such as a rescue manager or a police field manager meet in the 
control and command room to work with each other. The Command and Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(MRCC Turku) is their management and marine rescue center. The management relationships may be unclear in 
such cases, therefore it is important to meet. Different authorities do not receive real time information about 
available aid from voluntary associations, not even the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre.  
 
The West Finland Coast Guard District is responsible for security in the whole sea area in Western Finland. They 
have a situation and analysis team that is there for half of the day. The same group has three customs officers 
who work with them daily. It is a daily operational mode. 
 
The area of operations of the West Finland Coast Guard District covers the emergency area of four emergency 
centers. Virve has only a maximum of 20 call groups per workstation. This means that the monitored area is 
quite wide and one major accident will relocate resources from daily routine to a more serious accident. It is 
possible to control all the groups that they want with one terminal device, but they have to share the groups 
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between the different workstations. This procedure helps them better analyze events. The field commander and 
officer in charge of rescue operations decide together if it is necessary to issue a major accident alert. The coast 
guard does not have a shared situational awareness system for cross-border cooperation. Currently, the 
situational picture of an individual patroller is based on the Virve communications and background information 
that has been collected before via radio communication, for example. There is no possibility to use visual real 
time data communication systems, but the surveillance aircraft has a good camera that records events and 
transfers data to the MRCC. The use of real time video is not currently possible. The flow of real time data is not 
transmitted, for example, from cruise ships or from patrol vessels to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre. 
Small ships or boats that are attempting to cross the Schengen border create additional challenges, especially in 
situations where the transponders are switched off. They have a certain number of cameras in the archipelago 
and in places they support border control. The cameras allow tracking and identifying which ships are operating 
there. Underwater surveillance is carried out in cooperation with the Finnish Navy.   
 
Operational field work covers statutory tasks involving the leading positions of other authorities as provided by 
the law on the Border Guard (Border Guard Act) such as executive assistance tasks and the management of 
Maritime Rescue. It includes, for example, that oil spills and initial actions for the fight against oil spills belongs 
nationwide to them, also in the Gulf of Finland. Concerning sea rescue, international contacts are handled in 
neighboring countries and, as the case may be, more broadly. A special function is the coordination of the entire 
Finnish Border Guard's flight operations as appropriate. Airbase stations are located in Helsinki, Rovaniemi and 
Turku.  
 
In Turku, there is also a surveillance aircraft. Aviation operations are coordinated by a field commander in Turku. 
If the Gulf of Finland coast guard has a sea rescue mission, they can use aerial vehicles in Helsinki. Helicopters 
are widely used by other authorities in their tasks, such as to transfer patients to hospitals and to search for fire. 
They practice and participate in multiauthority exercises, major accident exercises and rescue exercises. There 
are several maritime rescue authorities in Finland that, using their own special expertise, take part in the task 
and, accordingly, border control takes part in other tasks and helps with the equipment if necessary.  
5. Discussion 
Computing technology in most control centers, situational centers and emergency response centers is based on 
sequential computing and the infrastructure based on human capabilities and activities. To support the next-
generation hybrid smart control center monitoring, analysis and control functions, the parallel computing 
infrastructure needs to be implemented with proper prioritizing and scheduling different real time simulation 
tasks. 
 
Government agents, utility executives, policymakers and technology providers must agree on a common goal 
and take actions to accelerate the process towards ﬁnal deployment, and legal and organizational barriers have 
to be removed. Given the scale of the effort required and the enormity of the challenges ahead, collaboration 
among different sectors is essential and should be developed through various channels in order to ensure and 
accelerate the success of the future smart control centers. 
6. Conclusion 
Limited data transmission and the lack of visual real time data capabilities prevent the formulation of an accurate 
situational picture in MRCC Turku. Coast Guard patrols cannot share real time information with other patrols or 
the MRCC Turku. There is a need to strengthen the entire maritime intelligence ecosystem. The greatest need 
for new sensor technology is at sea (Lemponen, 2012). There is also a need in command and control functions 
to design a combination of a new kind of hybrid sensor technology that uses OSINT tools in order to detect 
threats in advance because a cyber situational picture is needed. For example, drug trafficking can be prevented 
by more effective hybrid-based intelligence.  
 
Effective cooperation between security authorities needs a common technology for all authorities. Municipal 
actors relying on municipal technical resources is not sustainable because cooperation between the Finnish 
Border Guard and emergency services has developed, especially at the site of the scene of maritime accidents. 
Organizational cooperation requires a common infrastructure and clearer and faster connections. The DSiP 
telemeter includes mobile communication, IT systems and a command and control center. The DSiP solution is 
already in use with the Finnish Border Guard, but its potential could be better utilized (Hult, 2012). 
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Open source intelligence is an applicable emergency response tool for public safety authorities. The presented 
hybrid model will offer an updated emergency response management model to PPDR services. Currently, new 
information systems are already out of date when they are introduced.   
 
A dynamic cyber-physical ecosystem or infrastructure is needed in order to respond to a rapidly evolving 
maritime alert situation. It is obsolete to manage public safety organizations as separate public safety actors. 
The internal and external security atmosphere can no longer be separated in the traditional sense. Threats have 
changed into combinations of threat types and, as a consequence, public safety organizations like the Finnish 
Border Guard must be able to prevent new kinds of hybrid threats and respond to them. Improving the flow of 
information between the public sector and citizens, including volunteer associations, is also a relevant part of 
this framework. It must be possible to prevent and respond faster to the realization of threats. A modelling 
platform for a smart emergency response model can lead to important new results. The cyber domain can be 
used as a powerful dimension to enhance data fusion to more accurate overall situational awareness. By 
processing raw data on anomalous behavior in advance, PPDR services can use smart emergency response 
functions before any threats have occurred, as illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Hybrid Emergency Response model with OSINT 
The next generation hybrid model will integrate existing surveillance systems and networks with new ones and 
give all concerned authorities access to the information they need for their missions at sea. Combining pieces of 
open source information to ensure correct and reliable information is shared is of primary importance. The 
essential information is processed in the desired form for the accident site command center. The next generation 
emergency response system is based on active operations and automated functions. At the very least, a direct 
communication connection without unnecessary intermediaries must exist from the situation center to the 
government situation center.  
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